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Abstract—Confidently distinguishing a malicious intru-
sion over a network is an important challenge. Most intru-
sion detection system evaluations have been performed in
a closed set protocol in which only classes seen during
training are considered during classification. Thus far,
there has been no realistic application in which novel types
of behaviors unseen at training – unknown classes as it
were – must be recognized for manual categorization. This
paper comparatively evaluates malware classification using
both closed set and open set protocols for intrusion recog-
nition on the KDDCUP’99 dataset. In contrast to much of
the previous work, we employ a fine-grained recognition
protocol, in which the dataset is loosely open set – i.e.,
recognizing individual intrusion types – e.g., “sendmail”,
“snmp guess”, ..., etc., rather than more general attack
categories (e.g., “DoS”,“Probe”,“R2L”,“U2R”,“Normal”).
We also employ two different classifier types – Gaussian
RBF kernel SVMs, which are not theoretically guaranteed
to bound open space risk, and W-SVMs, which are
theoretically guaranteed to bound open space risk. We find
that the W-SVM offers superior performance under the
open set regime, particularly as the cost of misclassifying
unknown classes at query time (i.e., classes not present in
the training set) increases. Results of performance tradeoff
with respect to cost of unknown as well as discussion of
the ramifications of these findings in an operational setting
are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion detection systems aim to ascertain if
a system is under attack by either 1.) detecting
anomalies or 2.) recognizing signatures of known
attack patterns. Anomaly detection approaches label
behavior that deviates from a “normal” model as
anomalous, often making an implicit (and flawed)
assumption that anomalies correspond to intrusive
or problematic events [1]. However, anomalies can
naturally spring up from benign activity, e.g., system
re-configurations. The conflation between anoma-
lous events and intrusive events often accounts for
higher false positive rates of anomaly-based sys-
tems. The high false positive rates and lack of di-
agnostic information are two reasons why anomaly-
based systems are seldom deployed in practice [2].
Nonetheless, anomaly based approaches offer an
important capability that discriminative signature
based approaches generally do not: namely, they
generalize to novel classes of attacks.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 1: THE OPEN SET PROBLEM. In a, a closed-
set classifier is trained to discriminate between four classes
(blue, green, yellow, and red). Samples from a different class
not in the training set (white) will, at classification time, b,
be misclassified as blue (and with high confidence if distance-
based probability calibration is applied). Open set recognition,
c, aims to discriminate samples from classes within the closed
set, while limiting the scope of its decision by the support
of the training data. Via this support bound, samples from a
novel class are labeled “unknown” rather than mis-ascribed
to the wrong class.
Most signature methods, by contrast, classify at-
tack patterns based on features from previously seen
attack and normal system states. Several techniques
can be employed to perform signature matching,
including exact/partial matching, formal grammars,
and machine learning [3]. One advantage of sig-
nature matching is that it can provide diagnostic
information by performing not only intrusion de-
ar
X
iv
:1
70
3.
02
24
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  7
 M
ar 
20
17
tection – which answers the question “is an at-
tack occurring?” – but also intrusion recognition –
which answers the question “what kind of attack
is occurring?”. Of course, the degree of diagnostic
information provided depends on the granularity
at which the system was trained: training with
unspecific labels is insufficient to provide useful
diagnostics; rather, a fine-grained multi-class dis-
criminative regime is ideal, in which classification
is performed on individual exploits instead of on
nebulous attack meta-labels.
Unfortunately, fine-grained labeling requires con-
siderable overhead, and attack databases must be
continuously updated for discriminative signature-
based methods to work well. Despite their other
advantages, signature methods do not generalize
well to novel attack types. As more attack types
emerge, one must choose carefully, especially under
limited resources, which samples to label and use to
update the classifier. Notably, one must make this
decision under an Open Set assumption – that sam-
ples seen at classification time do not necessarily
come from classes seen in the training set. Thus,
both approaches – anomaly based and signature
based – have their own unique merits and flaws.
In this paper we propose a theoretical framework to
best reconcile the merits of both systems into one
unified framework, which allows fine-grained dis-
crimination between known malware samples and
also offers the capability to recognize when samples
at classification time come from a previously unseen
class.
II. AN OPEN SET APPROACH
To arrive at this unified framework, we borrow
from [4], [5], the concept of Open Set Recogni-
tion, which aims to balance the minimization of
empirical risk – the risk of misclassifying known
signatures – with open space risk – the risk of
matching signatures from novel exploits to types
of either intrusive or normal behavior not present
in the (closed) training set. In the most basic sense,
classes utilized in testing are not present in training.
Recognition gives the assumption that classes are
recognized in a much larger space of classes that
are not recognized. When dealing with the open
set recognition problem, the data will have multiple
known classes and many unknown classes. The
unknowns are what make the problem open set.
Under an open set framework, anomaly detection
methodologies are employed not to label data as
corresponding to a known class (e.g., malicious),
but rather to mark query samples that lack statistical
support from the training set as “unknown”. For
samples in regions of high support, the decision
of the discriminative signature based classifier is
used; in regions of low support the sample is
marked “unknown” for subsequent analysis and
potentially retraining/updating the classifier. The
“unknown” sample is in a region far away from
known data, meaning that no other class is nearby to
support classification. The Weibull-calibrated SVM
(W-SVM) classifier [4], which we use for our
experiments, uses statistical extreme value theory
(EVT) [6], to provide a probability of sample in-
clusion within a class. The W-SVM attempts to
quantify the region and produce a more natural way
of stating how far is far, without prior decision of
some ad-hoc threshold.
The distinction between “known” and “unknown”
regions of signature space is particularly important
if we wish to leverage the powerful generaliza-
tion capabilities of machine learning. Discrimina-
tive classifiers parameterize decision boundaries in
high-dimensional signature space by partitioning the
space according to an empirical risk minimization
criterion. This often leads to decision regions of
unbounded support. Consider the decision bound-
aries in Fig. 1b, which ascribe class labels from
the closed set of training instances to unlimited
space. Properly, a classifier should “make decisions”
consistent with Fig. 1c, only labeling instances as
originating from a known class if there is data-
driven support for these decisions.
Note also that the intrusion detection problem
is really a generalization of the intrusion recogni-
tion problem. While intrusion detection may appear
closed-set insofar as there are only two classes, i.e.,
intrusive and benign, by giving up fine-grained cate-
gorizations for ease of implementation, the problem
of novel samples arriving at unsupported regions
of feature space still holds. Thus, approaches that
simplify the intrusion recognition problem to a
detection problem for ease of closed-set treatment
do not actually address the open set problem; they
Fig. 2: INTRUSION HEIRARCHIES. Samples can be labeled at many granularities, e.g., fine-grained categorization of
individual exploits, attack metatypes, and detection level, i.e., malicious/benign. For the KDDCUP’99 dataset, shown in this
figure, exploits highlighted in blue are only present in the test set, not the training set. Because of this discrepancy between
training and test sets, an open set protocol is necessary when performing classification at the exploit level. Although it was
not their intent, the designers of the KDDCUP’99 naturally ended up in an open set scenario where certain types of attacks
only occurred at query time.
ignore it. Open set exists even in a closed-set prob-
lem with just malicious or benign samples. More-
over, we believe that instead of over-simplifying
the problem, we will explore a more meaningful
level of fine-grained recognition, since it yields
important diagnostic information about attack class
types. The problem in the world today is not just
that an attack exists, but what kind of attack and
what can be done. Something to take into account
as well are the findings from [3]. Rudd et al.
surveyed malicious stealth technologies and existing
autonomous countermeasures. Their findings sug-
gest that while machine learning has potential for
generic and autonomous solutions, several flawed
assumptions fundamental to most recognition al-
gorithms inhibit a discrete mapping between the
stealth malware recognition problem and a machine
learning solution. The closed set assumption was the
most notable of these flawed assumptions. Unseen
classes at classification time exist for real-world
intrusion recognition tasks, and neither all variations
of malicious code nor all variations of harmless
behavior can be known apriori.
III. EXPERIMENTS
To demonstrate the gains obtained from moving
to an open set regime, we performed an open
set analysis on the KDDCUP’99 dataset – one of
the most popular datasets in intrusion detection
literature [7]. We selected this dataset because it
is widely used, and offers a basis for comparison
of our framework. However, this dataset is old
and does not accurately reflect a modern network
environment [2], so our experiments should be
viewed as a verification of the theory behind our
framework, not as an operational assessment of a
deployable system. No research that we could find
uses the KDDCUP’99 dataset in an exploit-level
open set evaluation. We suspect that this is because,
when working at the detection level, or the meta-
class recognition level, the problem can be over-
simplified to closed-set, which assumes that any
instance showing up at query time will lie in a
region of “known” support. However, as we see
in Fig. 2, when operating at the individual exploit
level, there are a number of distinct exploit types in
the test set that do not occur in the training set.
Other algorithms have had a difficult time doing
well with the dataset because it is still not a solved
problem. Thus when working at the finer exploit-
level granularity, we cannot ignore the open set
problem and should operate under an open set
protocol.
The dataset consists of connection vectors of
41 features, each of which is labeled according
to Fig. 2. Prior to conducting our evaluation, we
followed standard practice of removing the large
number of redundant records in the dataset [8],
[9]. Tavallaee et al. analyzed the KDDCUP’99
dataset and discovered that 78% and 75% of the
records are duplicated in the train and test set,
respectively. Within the train set, these redundancies
will cause learning algorithms to be biased towards
more frequent records, which in turn hinder it from
learning infrequent samples. Infrequent samples are
typically more harmful to networks, for example,
User to Root Attacks (U2R). Within the test set,
redundancies will cause the evaluation results to
be biased towards methods that have better de-
tection rates on the more frequent records. The
reduction reduced the training set from 4898431
entries to 1074974 entries and reduced the test set
from 311029 entries to 77216 entries. We noticed
that two of the classes within the training set still
accounted for a disproportionate amount of the data,
so we downsampled these classes by a factor of 100.
Classes with fewer than 20 samples we removed
entirely from the training set. To format the data
for learning we normalized each vector element to
a 0-1 range using a linear min-max scaling across all
data on an element-wise basis. For the categorical
data, we assigned integer values corresponding to an
index in a number of categories prior to conducting
the scaling.
In our analysis, we performed a comparison be-
tween two analogous classifiers: a multi-class closed
set Gaussian RBF kernel Platt-calibrated [10] SVM,
and a multi-class open set Gaussian RBF kernel W-
SVM [4]. For the Platt-calibrated SVM, a sigmoid
is used to normalize scores to reflect probabilities
(i.e., scores are monotonically increasing with dis-
tance from the decision boundary), whereas the W-
SVM’s compact abating probabilities (CAP models)
are mathematically guaranteed to abate away from
regions of known support (implementation details
can be found in [4]). This is also shown in Fig. 3.
In order to determine a good value for C and
γ in our experiments, we first performed a 3-
fold cross validated order of magnitude grid search
over the training set. We used a grid of C, γ ∈
{10−5, 10−3, . . . , 105}. Based upon accuracy over
this grid search, we selected a C value of 1000 and
a γ value of 0.1 for training our classifiers.
We evaluated classification error in terms of both
closed and open set accuracy. For the closed set
protocol this is simply the number of correctly
classified test instances out of the total number of
Fig. 3: Let red correspond to the decision boundary. Platt
calibration (sigmoidal) with respect to distance from the
decision boundary of an RBF SVM does not bound open space
risk because when thresholded (green), the calibration still
labels unbounded space with approximately 100% probability.
Probabilities of inclusion returned from a Weibull-calibrated
W-SVM (e.g., blue) abate to zero with distance from the actual
data, and thus provably bound open space risk.
test instances, which does not account for unknown
classes: i.e., all test instances with labels not present
in the training set will be misclassified under this
protocol. For the Platt-calibrated RBF SVM we
obtained a closed set accuracy of 91.1%. For the W-
SVM we obtained a closed set accuracy of 90.1%.
A common misconception is that the start off accu-
racy difference should theoretically yield the same
closed-set accuracy for both classifiers, however,
that is not the case because each classifier utilizes a
different model. Also, we attribute the discrepancy
to implementation-level differences introduced by
Scheirer et al. in the W-SVM solver [4].
For evaluating under an open set protocol we
thresholded probabilities returned by both W-SVM
and the Platt-calibration on the RBF SVM by a
variety of different thresholds. We do not address
threshold selection in this paper, although this has
been discussed in several other works including [5]
and [4]. Instead, we inspected results under a variety
of thresholds from 0.1 to 0.3. We found that both
of these thresholds close the accuracy gap such
that each classifier performs at 91.5% open set
recognition accuracy, indicating that the open set W-
SVM sees gains over the closed set Platt calibrated
SVM when evaluated under an open set protocol.
However, these gains are limited because despite
the number of classes in the test set not seen in the
training set (cf. Fig. 2), over 95% of classes are still
from known samples. To indicate the actual gains
of the open set classifier for unknown classes, we
introduce the concept of “Cost of Unknown” – i.e.,
the impact on perceived accuracy with respect to
number of unknown samples. This is achieved by
weighting the relative importance of accuracy on
known and unknown partitions of the test data –
e.g., meaning a 10% cost of unknown weight open
set accuracy on unknown classes in the test set at
0.1 and closed set accuracy of known classes at
0.9. Fig. 4 depicts perceived accuracy as the cost
of unknown increases. When accuracy on unknown
samples is given no weight, the Platt-calibrated
SVM offers slightly better performance, but as we
sligtly upweight the cost of unknown to just 7%,
(i.e., accurate classification of unknown is given 7%
weight, whereas accurate classification of known
is given 93%) the W-SVM’s performance quickly
eclipses that of the RBF SVM, with an increasing
performance gap as cost of unknown increases.
IV. DISCUSSION
Our evaluation demonstrates that open set recog-
nition has potential to benefit intrusion recognition
applications. Curves like the one in Fig. 4 can
serve to choose between open-set and closed-set
classifiers for the application at hand. The closed set
classifier performed comparably to the open set clas-
sifier on the KDDCUP’99 dataset open set protocol,
when considering both known and unknown classes,
closing the performance gap in the purely closed
set regime. However, it is important to consider
that the majority of the KDDCUP’99 test partition
is dominated with “known” benign samples, which
may well be anomalous with respect to the support
of the training data. With that in mind, amidst a
sea of non-malicious traffic are anomalies that can
compromise the secure state of the network. Thus,
the cost of mislabeling an unknown sample is highly
dependent on operational constraints. Once a sample
has been classified as unknown, the instance can
be blocked until further review. A security expert
should then review the sample, classify it accord-
ingly, and train a newer version of the classifier.
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Fig. 4: OPEN SET EVALUATION. This figure depicts
decay in accuracy as we up-weight the cost of labeling an
unknown instance as coming from a known class for both
open-set and closed-set classifiers. Labels thresh RBF and
thresh W correspond to Platt-calibrated and W-SVM classi-
fiers respectively. As we can see, the open set W-SVM does a
better job of rejecting unknown samples for both 0.1 and 0.3
probability thresholds.
In the future, whether that sample is malicious or
benign, the classifier should detect anything similar
to its type. In a perfect world, the system would not
need any human input, but current methods cannot
achieve that. Implementing this into an existing
intrusion recognition system would be ideal as our
experiments offer the first experimental proof points
that suggest using an open-set approach has some
potential for distinguishing novel types of behavior.
An important topic for future work is assessing
the quantity of unknown samples that one would
expect to see in realistic environments. This number
can vary considerably depending on the scenario,
and quantifying “unknown” can be difficult when
different classes of data are ill-defined – e.g., should
a previously unseen form of novel “normal” be-
havior be labeled as unknown? According to our
open set protocol the answer is no, because we only
have labels of finite granularity, but in a realistic
operational setting, the story may be different. Other
factors such as environment and security levels
might also come into play.
Finally, we mention that KDDCUP’99 is a very
old dataset and offers little to no utility as a bench-
mark for the performance of intrusion detection
systems on a modern network. At the time of
publication, we were unaware of any newer and
related datasets. We used it in this paper merely
to demonstrate the gains attained by incorporating
open set recognition protocols at fine granularity
on a canonical network intrusion detection dataset.
A more realistic dataset would allow for more
thorough evaluation of our open set protocol.
The creation of such a dataset by academia is
nearly impossible. Privacy policies and concerns
are the biggest barrier for the formulation of an
updated and improved dataset. Simulating real net-
work traffic with real day-to-day users at a large
scale is relatively easy, but unpractical. A university
would simply not allow student’s confidential data
to be utilized by any means. Future work will
require performance assessments on more realistic
datasets where gains from an open set recognition
system could be significantly higher, and many of
these datasets must come from collaboration with
industry. The degree to which open set recognition
works well is largely a function of the dataset.
Overall, the RBF SVM outperformed the W-SVM
on a purely closed set evaluation of the data, but
we saw a shift in applying an increasingly open
set evaluation where the W-SVM took the lead
in performance accuracy. In the future, these tech-
niques should be extended to a better dataset and re-
evaluated thereon. We demonstrated that when the
cost of unknown increases, however, by applying
an open set protocol, we were able to garner useful
results that closed set classifiers cannot deliver.
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